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ABSTRACT
This paper reviews the existing treaties for ban and verification of
the production and use of chemical weapons. The proposed Chemical
Weapons Convention, its thrust areas of verifications, the organisations
for and process of verification are discribed briefly. Various technical
verification measures including field techniques, such as detector
papers, tubes, enzyme tickets, etc. and analytical methods such as gas
chromatography, microsensors, different spectrometry methods
including IR techniques and stationary systems are also discussed.
1. INTRODUCTION
Chemical Weapons do definitely grab the honour of being the most talked about
weapons, about which every nation wants to do something, but seems incapable of
any real action. The world comity of nations took it as a discussion point more than
a century ago in 1874; further at the two Hague conferences at the turn of the century,
these were clubbed with aircrafts and submarines for ban from warfare. The Geneva
Protocol of 1925 prohibited the use, but not research, development, production and
stockpile. Most of the nations accepted the Geneva Protocol reserving the right to
retaliate in kind when used against them. There were no clauses for any verification
in the Geneva Protocol. Since 1973, bilateral and multilateral parleys are going on in
Geneva at the Chemical Disarmament Conference, while the nations, big and small
are acquiring the skills to produce and use chemical weapons as shown by Iraq and
alleged about Libya. This proliferation of chemical weapons to the Third World seems
to prod the super powers to come to a negotiated bilateral settlement, at the same
time lacking faith in the credibility of Third World, not openly expressed. This has
made technical verification a very important aspect of chemical disarmament.
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The word, verification in terms of the proposed Chemical Weapons Convention,
which is presently being discussed at Geneva, is the demonstration of compliance to
the treaty by the state parties participating in the agreement. The US Arms Control
and Disarmament Agency calls verification ‘the critical element of arms control’, while
the USSR favours a ‘reasonable balanced verification’ without giving it an
extraordinary pre-eminence and extension to absurd limits. It is apparent that the
verification has a number of facets, which includes a political facet as well, because
of the extent and nature of verification would depend on the faith amidst the parties;
in multilateral treaties, as the proposed Chemical Weapons Treaty, this political
element of verification has taken equal or more importance than others because of
the proliferation of chemical weapons into the Third World.
2. WHAT IS TO BE VERIFIED?
Article VI (b) of the proposed Chemical Weapons Convention enjoins the
signatories to ensure that toxic chemicals and their precursors are not developed,
produced or otherwise acquired, retained, transferred or used within its territory or
anywhere under its jurisdiction or control for purposes prohibited by the Convention.
These toxic chemicals and their precursors have tentatively been categorised under
three schedules; the first schedule includes the nerve gases, (soman,  sarin, tabun and
VX) sulphur and nitrogen mustards, lewisites, quiniclidinyl benzilate (BZ) and
precursors for the binary weapon, codenamed DF and QL. The only use of these
chemicals is for warfare and these are termed single purpose chemicals. The second
schedule contains the key precursors for production of the above chemicals and the
third schedule consists of toxic industrial chemicals like phosgene, cyanogen chloride,
hydrogen cyanide and chloropicrin as also starting materials like phosphorous
oxychloride, phosphorous trichloride, di and trimethyl esters of phosphorous, sulphur
mono and dichlorides. Some of these have been used in World War I, but presently
are more of industrial importance and as such are called dual purpose chemicals.
Some important characteristics of Schedule I compounds which would be subjected
to verification are given in Table 1.
TabIe 1. Characteristks  uf Scheduk I compounds of the proposed  Chemical  Weapons Conver~tIon
Substance State at
25°C
Volatility at
25°C
h3per~31
Effect Time taken for the
appearance of
symptoms
Tabun
S a r i n
Soman
V-agents
Hydrogen
cyanide
Mustard gas
B Z
Colourless
(yellow-brown) liquid
Colourleu  liquid
-de
Colourless (yellow)
liquid
Colourless liquid
do-
Solid white substance
516 Nerve agent
16,400 -de
3,060 -de
330 -do-
Inhalation : l-5  minutes
Skin : 30-6Ominutes
-do-
-do-
-do-
166 General poison Some minutes
930 Injurious to skin 3 hours
Affects nervous system 15-60  minutes
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The proposed Convention demands declaration and destruction of all chemical
weapons and production facilities in a specified period of time and also provides access
to international teams for inspection and verification of compliance.
The areas for verification would be: (a) non-production of chemical weapons,
(b) destruction of stock-piles, (c) non-diversion of dual purpose chemicals from
industrial use to weapon production, and (d) alleged use of any toxic chemicals in
war in violation of the convention.
The Convention also desires implementation of all these functions in a very
non-intrusive manner without hampering the economic or technological development
of the parties. This verification is to some extent different from espionage activities
for intelligence collection as it will be with the consent of the parties.
3. THE ORGANISATIONS  FOR VERIFICATION
It is interesting to note here that the Geneva Convention of 1925 on Chemical
and Biological Weapons, as also the Biological Weapons Convention of 1972 have
not mentioned the aspects of verification, or suggested any institutional structure for
the purpose. The nuclear weapon treaties like the Partial Test Ban Treaty of 1963,
Non-proliferation Treaty of 1968, Strategic Arms Limitation Talks I and II, etc. have
all incorporated a variety of monitoring techniques by national technical means, black
boxes or automated recording instruments, selective as also unrestricted on-site
inspection and an international organisation, the International Atomic Energy Agency,
for ensuring safeguards and checking violations.
The proposed Convention envisages setting up a National Implementation
Authority with a technical secretariat for data collection, verification and reporting.
Article VIII of the Convention structures an international organisation with a technical
secretariat to whom the national organisations would report. It is obvious that nations
having chemical weapons would need a strong and large national organisation, while
nations like India, which have opted not to go in for chemical weapons, need only a
rudimentary set-up for the purpose. Essentially, a national organisation would depend
on the importance and gravity of the threat chemical weapons as also the avowed
policy and attitudes of the national governments.
4. THE PROCESS OF VERIFICATION
A number of activities are called for involving different agencies in the process
of verification of non-production/alleged use of chemical weapons as shown in Fig. 1.
Confidence building measures like exchange of information, on-site inspection, etc.
are built into the system. But unlike the development of nuclear weapons and test
explosions, which need fairly large facilities for production which are difficult to
conceal, the chemical weapons production facilities can be comparatively small and
concealed easily. The ensuing sections concisely describe the methodsof verification.
4.1 Economic Monitoring
It is possible to find out diversion of raw materials, products, etc. from normal
production to clandestine purposes, provided that all the commercial data is kept
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Figure 1. Activities of various agencies involved in the verification of production and
usage of chemical weapons.
truthfully. But it is too much to expect from any nation/chemical industry clandestinely
producing chemical weapons to present the correct data on a platter. It would need
a deep scrutiny to make out the fudging of data. It is very difficult to put much faith
on economic monitoring, but a proper surveillance can deter to a small extent any
illegal activity.
4.2 Technical Verification
Technical verification is essential for (a) field detection necessary for warning
the troops to wear protective equipment as also for notifying international agencies
for violation of the Convention, and (b) for verification of clandestine production
through ambient air and effluent monitoring. We shall deal with these aspects at
length as quite some progress in applied instrumentation has resulted in the
developments of equipment needed for the purpose.
The developments in this field could be categorised into (a) field techniques,
which are equipped with portable or vehicle mounted equipment, and (b) more
elaborate stationary systems which can be used in analytical laboratories for analysis
of air and effluent samples.
4.2.1 Field Techniques
There are a variety of inexpensive but reliable detectors, which can be used by
the soldiers in the field for the detection. of war gases.
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Detector papers : Chemical impregnated filter papers are the simplest of the
devices for the purpose. The change in colour of these papers denotes the presence
of toxic gases in the atmosphere. Dimethylaminobenzaldehyde, dinitrobenzyl pyridine
and dichloroindophenol are commonly used. ‘These are specific for individual toxic
agents and a number of these papers have to be used for detection of all the agents.
Detector tubes : These are hermetically sealed glass tubes with a small quantity
of silica gel impregnated with specific chemicals. The tubes are broken at both the
ends and aerated with a pump. Change of colour denotes the presence of toxic gases,
for which the tube is specific. The shelf life of these tubes are longer than of the paper
detectors and these are highly economical to produce.
The button : It is a refined form of detector exclusively for nerve gas with
cholinesterase enzyme immobilised on a filter paper. The substrate is on another
paper disc and these are brought together, after moistening with a bubble of water
kept in between, by pressure. The button is kept near the nose or (at the inlet of the
gas mask in case it is worn) and the inhaled air passes through the button. If the
enzyme is inhibited by toxic nerve gases in the atmosphere, there will be no change
in colour, otherwise it turns blue. These are commercially produced by Duphar of
Netherlands and provided to the NATO troops.
Enzyme tickets : This is again a simple device based on enzyme inhibition ability
of nerve gases. The enzyme used is plaice (a variety of fish) cholinesterase and the
substrate is 2, 6, dichloroindophenylacetate on Whatman filtef paper discs. The two
are brought together with moisture and when there is no colour change, the air is
contaminated with toxic nerve gases. This has been developed by the Swedes and the
shelf life is claimed to be 5 years.
Automatic detectors : Many of the automatic detectors for nerve gas detection
make use of the same basic principle of inhibition of cholinesterase enzyme. Vapour
pressure of the mustards are low to employ a vapour sampling technique at lower
temperatures.
Nerve agent immobilised enzyme alarm and detector (NAIAD) : Developed in
UK, NAIAD is designed to suck in ambient air through pads of immobilised
cholinesterase enzyme kept moist with a solution of the substrate, normally thiocholinyl
butyrate. Detection is by an electro-chemical detector sensing the changes in pH as
butyric acid is formed on hydrolysis of the substrate by the enzyme, when nerve gases
are present in the atmosphere, cholinesterase enzyme is inhibited and there would
be no change in pH due to the absence of butyric acid formation. The detector is
latched on to a remote audio alarm unit. These can be mounted on a vehicle as well.
Cholinesterase pads have to be changed every 12 hours and the equipment needs
constant attention.
Alarm system, chemical agent, local (ACAL) : Developed in Netherlands, ACAL
is based on the same enzyme inhibition principle but with a slight variation. The
reactions take place on a moving tape .wetted  with enzyme solution and subtrate,
through which ambient air is sucked in and is kept in continuous motion. The change
in colour is recorded by a photometer connected to an audio-alarm. This again has
the drawback of using liquid solutions, the stability of which are important.
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4.2.2 Gas Chromatographic Systems
The major problem in using gas chromatographic (GC) systems for field detection
has been the size of the equipment and the need to carry cylinders of the carrier gas,
nitrogen or argon. The systems developed initially, attempted to miniaturise the
equipment, and an automated continuous air monitoring system (ACAMS)  was
developed in the US around 1980. The toxic gas (mustards or nerve gas) is adsorbed
on a resin column (poropak Q or tenax GC) by air sampling and then thermally
desorbed on to the GC column flushing with nitrogen. Detection is by a flame
photometric detector.
This system was further improved by the Swedes. The inlet consists of an adsorbent
tube which can be desorbed thermally. The tube acts as sample concentrator during
the sampling period, as injector at desorption and for purification of sampled air so
that’it can be used as carrier gas, which eliminates the need for cylinders. Capillary
column with photo-ionisation detectors are used. The heart of the instrument is the
microprocessor which regulates inlet, oven, detector and pump; as also it processes
the signal from the detector for the desired presentation of data. The instrument can
be programmed exclusively for mustards and nerve gases.
The Finnish work : Since 1973, the Finns have taken up work on improving the
gas chromatograph for detection purposes. From 1977 onwards, their results are
published through books by their Ministry of Foreign Affairs, presently well-accepted
as Finnish Blue Books’. A microprocessor-controlled precision gas chromatograph,
Micromat, was developed by the Finnish industry in the early 1980s for this purpose.
Reliability of the gas chromatography has been increased by using two parallel columns
with different stationary phases, one polar and another non-polar phase, together
with index of standard compounds and both universal and selective detectors.
Retention index values, i.e., the time spent by each compound on the column, are
stored in the computer memory and when a particular sample contains any of, the
agents tallying with the stored retention indices, identification can be done by matching.
This has been further modified using six short capillary columns instead of two
with different stationary phases. When a single compound elutes through the bunch
of columns, in an ideal case, the retention spectrum will have as many peaks as
columns and will be very characteristic of a particular chemical. In this case, the
chemical is not really identified, but a ‘finger print’ comparison with recorded spectra
is effected. But one drawback here is the overlap of signals, which has also been
eliminated by more refinement of the technique.
Furhter separation is effected by connecting two capillary columns in series and
only the set of peaks in which the analyst has interest is carried on to the second
column. The Finns have named this ‘heart cutting’ technique. Selected peaks from
six parallel columns can be flushed on to the analytical column and with the heart
cutting technique, retention spectra of the pure compound can be obtained. This is
also called as high resolution gas chromatography. These are not really field techniques
and need highly skilled scientists and excellent laboratory facilities.
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4.2.3 Chemical Microsensors
A number of sensitive detectors for chemical vapours using piezo electric devices,
surface acoustic wave (SAW) devices, optical waveguide spectrometers and
semiconductor devices have also been developed.
Piezo electric  devices : A gold plasted crystal of quartz (as used in oscillator
circuits) is coated with a layer of chemical which can selectively absorb or interact
with the agent of interest. If the crystal is made a part of the oscillator circuit, the
resonant frequency of the crystal shifts due to additional mass of the contaminant.
This frequency shift is measured in terms of the concentration of agent.
Another variant of piezo electric method is the SAW device. Here the time of
propagation of mechanical Rayleigh surface waves from one end of the crystal surface
to another end is measured. If the surface coating on the crystal absorbs or interacts
with a particular vapour or gas, a shift in propagation velocity is observed. High
sensitivities are possible. There are some problems related, to irreversibility and long
term stability of coatings.
Organic semiconductors : Conductivity cells coated with monolayer of organic
semiconductors or materials which exhibit selective interaction with
organophosphorous compounds (like materials containing complexed copper ions)
are used. Measurements using two identical cells (one isolated from ambient air as a
reference cell), are made and the change in conductivity measured. Similar coating on
active devices like junction field effect transistors has also been tried.
OpticaZ waveguides : Chemically coated optical waveguides when challenged with
a chemical agent produce colour changes which can be measured as a shift in
transmittance. Devices using a coating of oxazine dye film on a capillary tubing,
optically coupled to 560 nm pulsed light emitting diode have been developed for
detection of ammonia at ppm levels. However, like other semiconductor devices,
selectivity is poor and the system is quite complex.
4.2.4 Ion Mobility Spectrometry
A chemical agent monitor (CAM) has been developed in UK to monitor the
chemical warfare agents based on ion mobility spectrometry. Here the sampled air is
ionised by a radioactive source. The ions of the agent thus produced form ionic
clusters. These clusters then enter a drift tube which has a voltage gradient and an
ion collector at the other end. The rate (mobility) at which the ion clusters travel to
the collector is used to characterise  the agent. A voltage controlled grid of wires at
the entrance of drift tube controls the entry of ion clusters of interest.
These monitors are portable and rugged and are used as standard equipment by
the western armies. There are models which are available for civilian use for monitoring
different toxic gases in industries.
4.2.5 Mass Spectrometry
Though a laboratory based technique, it has now been modified for performing
chemical agent reconnaissance by Bruker Franzen for mobile use by mounting on a
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vehicle. This is a conventional quadrupole mass spectrometer with a difference. The
air inlet system is a flexible 3.5 m capillary column with silicone membrane filters at
both ends. The inlet membrane is heated and preferentially absorbs the agent. ‘Ihe
GC column coupled to the mass spectrometer helps in the separation of interferents
from the agent. The second silicone membrane couples the GC column to the
spectrometer. The capillary assembly is flexible and can be directed to the point of
interest. Measurement of concentration of the agent in air can be made in a few
minutes. The resolution can be further increased by using a 15 m
column and preconcentration of dilute sample on a tenax adsorbent tube.
4.2.6 Infrared Techniques
Infrared spectrometers are ideal for characterising warfare agents. However, the
sensitivity is very low. The sensitivity can be increased either by concentrating the
sample before introduction or by increasing the path length of the.IR beam through
the sampled air. The latter method has been used by Foxboro Inc. in their MIRAN
gas analyser. By an ingenious arrangement of mirrors, the path length can be increased
upto 20 m and sensitivity of the order of ppm can be achieved.
Another approach has been to use an extremely sensitive microphone to detect
photoacoustic signal from the cell. The cell is actually a chamber with a selectable IR
filter window and a sensitive microphone. Absorption of IR energy by the sample
increases the temperature and this causes an increase in the pressure. If IR beam is
chopped, then an acoustic signal is produced at the chopping frequency. This technique
has been used by Ms. Bruel and Kjaar of Denmark and they have produced very
sensitive monitors for industrial/environmental applications.
Laser beams in the IR range have been used for monitoring a gas cloud from a
distance of few kilometers. A system known as LIDAR, an acronym for light detection
and ranging, makes use of a tunable carbon dioxide laser which scans the suurounding
atmosphere. In the presence of an agent cloud, the beam is absorbed and the reflected
beam is compared with another beam tuned to non-absorbing region, the difference
being indicative of the presence of a chemical agent. The reflectance time difference
helps in ranging, for example, finding distance to the cloud. Rain, dust, ordinary
clouds, etc. are interferents. However, with the data processing techniques available
at present, this clutter can be reduced: This system is very expensive and only the
US and France are working on it at present.
4.2.7 Stationary Systems
A pre-requisite for all the stationary analyses is a sample from the field which
necessitates field sampling techniques. Sampling in liquids by bubblers is the earlier
method, which had the drawbacks of (a) carrying the bubblers and sampled solutions,
and (b) vapourisation of the sampled toxicant alongwith sampling liquid, if
vapourisation is high as in the case of cyanides. The more recent method is the
sampling on synthetic resins like tenax or XAD with an efficient constant flow rate
battery-operated portable pump. The resins are packed into small tubes of uniform
diameter and air sucked through the same. A constant flow rate would permit
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calculation of the total air sampled. Surface characteristics of the resins and their
polarity judge their suitability for adsorption of specific chemicals and it is essential
to know the breakthrough volume or the maximum amount of chemical which can
be adsorbed on the given quantity of resin. The desorption from the resins has to be
ideally total without any amount being retained. Solvent elution is used in many cases
for desorption but thermal desorption is a more elegant technique. Carbon is hardly
ever ,used for the purpose solely because of the difficulty in desorption.
All the analytical instruments like IR spectrophotometer, nuclear magnetic
resonance spectrometer, mass spectrometer, gas-liquid chromatograph and liquid
chromatograph as mentioned earlier can be used for analysis of the samples. It is
essential for all nations to have their own computerised databases even though such
data is available from the Finnish work. When these analyses are internationalised,
it would be very essential to lay down standard equipment and operating procedures,
to avoid furore  over faulty experimental techniques.
5. CONCLUSION
We have to remember that chemical production cannot be identified by a remote
analysis and on-site surprise inspections would be very necessary for verifications. As
for us in the Third World, who are avowed by policy not to produce chemical weapons,
simple inexpensive equipment should be the basis for developing all tests.
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